illustrates the range of estimates found in fairly comparable studies of married women's labor supply functions published during the last decade.2 In an attempt to control for some sources of variation, we exclude studies restricted to low income samples and those convoluting the labor force participation decision with the hours of work decision from this table.3 In addition, the table contains only studies using a measure of annual hours of work as the dependent variable. Each study presented here has stressed different theoretical and methodological issues. Some control for taxes, others control for wage rate endogeneity, and several take into account the issue of self-selection into the labor force.
Many reviews, such as Cain and Watts (1973), DaVanzo, DeTray, and Greenberg (1973), Garfinkel (1973) , Borjas and Heckman (1978) , Cogan (1980b; , Leuthold (1978) 1967 Estimates 14 -3.0 17. Leuthold (1978) 1969 Estimates 45 -7.1 18. Leuthold (1978) 1971 and Moffitt and Kehrer (1981), discuss possible sources for disparate estimates of labor supply parameters. In Table II we classify the studies in Table I by several potential sources of discrepancy. A careful examination of these tables together can suggest several explanations for the disparate estimates, but in order to make any definitive statements, a detailed empirical analysis that varies a number of economic and statistical assumptions one at a time is needed. We undertake such a sensitivity analysis by focusing on a simple model of the labor supply behavior of married women.4 In this model, the husband's behavior is considered exogenous, and a woman's labor supply is given by (1) hi =ao+al ln (wfi)+a2Yi+aZi+ei, where hi is the ith woman's hours of work during a given year, wfi is a measure of her wage rate, Yi is a measure of other income received by the household, Zi is a set of control variables, ei is a stochastic disturbance, and ao, a1, a2, and a3 are the parameters of the labor supply function. The vector Zi includes the wife's age, her years of schooling, the number of children less than six years old in the household, and the number of children between the ages of five and nineteen. When taxes are introduced into this model, a linearization of the budget set is used. The marginal after-tax wage rates replace the gross wages, and the intercept of the linearized budget constraint at zero hours of work replaces the income term.5
Several factors determined this choice of functional form. Most importantly, these or similar models are those most frequently found in the literature. Other models derived explicitly from a specification of the preference function could be analyzed, but the introduction of a new or rarely encountered functional form would introduce an additional source of discrepancies with previous studies.6 Furthermore, the linearity in the parameters allows for relatively simple estimation schemes and makes possible extensive testing of the hypotheses under consideration.
In this paper we examine three methodological considerations: exogeneity assumptions, statistical control for self-selection into the labor force, and the impact of controlling for taxes. In the first category, we test for the exogeneity of wage rates, nonwife income, children in the household, and the wife's labor market experience. In the second category, we test for the significance of the "Tobit" assumption and the presence of sample selection biases under a variety of distributional assumptions. We use statistical specification tests to uncover the importance of the methodological assumptions in the first two categories. The importance of accounting for taxes cannot be captured through parameter constraints and, as a result, we cannot explicitly test for the appropriate model in 4 Mroz (1984) contains a similar sensitivity analysis for a household model of married women's hours of work.
5Specifically, let w be the pre-tax wage rate, YN be the family's after tax income, h be the observed choice of hours of work, and r be the marginal tax rate. The wage measure used is ln [(1-r)w], and the income measure is the intercept of the linearized budget constraint, Yv = YN-(1 -r) wh. Hausman (1981) calls this income measure the wife's virtual income. 6 See Stern (1986) for the specification of the indirect utility function which yields the labor supply function used in this paper. During all other years the head of the household's interview supplied information about the wife's labor market experiences during the previous year. One suspects that the own reporting is more accurate, and it is for this reason that many recent studies of married women's labor supply have used these data.
Our sample consists of 753 married white women between the ages of 30 and 60 in 1975, with 428 working at some time during the year. This sample size is smaller than most used in the studies reported in Table I . The dependent variable, the wife's annual hours of work, is the product of the number of weeks the wife worked for money in 1975 and the average number of hours of work per week during the weeks she worked. The measure of the wage rate is the average hourly earnings, defined by dividing the total labor income of the wife in 1975 by the above measure of her hours of work. The nonwife income is defined as the household's total money minus the wife's labor income. The sample characteristics are presented in Table III and a detailed description of the data set construction can be found in Appendix 1. This paper contains three sections. The first examines the statistical assumptions in the basic model. The second section presents the results with the controls for taxes. The final section summarizes the main conclusions and uses the results of the empirical analysis to shed some light on the empirical discrepancies found in previous studies in this field.
THE BASIC LABOR SUPPLY MODEL

Choice of Baseline Specification
The estimates presented in Table IV demonstrate the sensitivity of the wage and income coefficients to minor variations in the variables used to instrument the wage rate.7 In this table (and Tables VI, VII , and VIII) we use the subsample of working women to calculate the estimates, and our estimation procedures (ordinary least squares and two stage least squares) do not control for selfselection into the labor force. Although many recent studies of female labor supply have stressed the importance of controlling for self-selection, we find these simple, "first generation," labor supply models an informative starting point for this analysis. In Section 1.6 we examine the empirical consequences of failing to account for the possible sample selection bias.
The first row of Table IV contains the ordinary least squares estimates. Rows two through six use as instruments for the wife's wage rate the wife's reported labor market experience,8 this variable squared, and several different polynomials in the wife's and husband's age and education. Rows seven through ten use the identical age-education polynomials as instruments, but do not contain measures of the wife's labor market experience. In order to translate the ln(wage) coefficients to uncompensated wage effects, we use the same point of evaluation as used in Table I Basmann's (1960) test.10 Using a five per cent level of significance, the best wage equation, in the sense of the simplest model which is not rejected in favor of the model containing the next higher order terms in the age-education polynomials, contains the cubic terms. This result holds for the wage specifications with the wife's labor force experience variables (specification 4), those without the experience variables (specification 8), and the specifications with the husband variables (specifications 5 and 9)." When the wife's labor force experience is not in the instrument set (rows 7 through 10) none of the overidentifying restrictions is rejected at the five per cent level. There is, however, some evidence of invalid overidentifying restrictions when the wife's labor market experience variables are used to help identify the wage effect. On the basis of these tests, we choose the specifications with the third order terms in the instrument set as the baseline specifications.12
Testing Model Specifications
The wide range of estimated wage effects found in Table IV (rows 2-6) yield larger wage responses than the rows without this set of instruments (rows 7-10). This suggests a possible specification error. To test for such errors, we apply variants of the specification tests proposed by Durbin (1954 Define another instrumental variable set Z2 = {X, X*, W}. Estimating equation (2) by instrumental variables using Z2 as instruments will yield an estimate 01 = (b, g) of the parameters 01 = (bl, g1). Under the null hypothesis, 01 is identical to 00 (see Sargan (1959) and Amemiya (1974) Hausman's (1978) formulae for the covariance matrix of the differences between the two sets of estimates. White (1982a) provides formulae for the covariance matrix of (01, 00) when quasi-maximum likelihood procedures are used to estimate 01 and 00. He shows that (01, 00) have an asymptotic normal distribution. In addition, the construction of the covariance matrix does not rely on either the normality or homoscedasticity of the disturbances, and it takes into account the correlation between these two sets of estimates. The actual formulae A A used to construct the covariance matrix of (01, 00) are described in Appendix 2.
Endogeneity of Wage Measures and Labor Market Experience Without Controls for Self-Selection Biases
In Table VI we present several sets of instrumental variables estimates for the wife's labor supply equation as well as tests of the equality of coefficients across these specifications. A comparison of the first two specifications suggests that the exogeneity assumption on the average hourly earnings is not unreasonable. This is a surprising result, for the average hourly earnings is defined by dividing the wife's labor earnings by the dependent variable; any measurement error in the hours of work measure should introduce a spurious negative correlation between this wage measure and the dependent variable. We shall return shortly to this observation and offer an alternative explanation for the similarity between these estimates. The second and third specifications differ only by the inclusion of the labor force experience variables in the reduced form wage equation. The difference in the point estimates on the wage coefficients is 627, and the asymptotic normal statistic for the equality of the wage coefficients takes the value 3.0; we conclude that the wife's labor market experience is an invalid instrumental variable. This result is in accord with Heckman's (1980) rejection of the exogeneity of the wife's labor force experience in the labor supply equation.
The comparison of specifications two and three belabors the obvious point that women who have worked many years in the past tend to have higher wages and work more in the present. Intuitively, the difference in the number of years worked between two women (identical in all other observed exogenous characteristics) reflects a systematic difference in the unobservables influencing their labor supplies (e.g., "tastes for work"). This makes the women's labor market experience endogenous to the labor supply function given in equation (1). As a result, the correlation between the predicted wage rate and a woman's hours of work obtained by predicting the wage with her previous labor market experience does not correspond to the economic notion of an uncompensated wage effect. The appropriate conceptual experiment requires an exogenous change in the wage rate (e.g., holding "tastes" constant), and the above test suggests that the variations across women in previous work experience do not satisfy the requisite ceteris paribus assumptions. 13 The unexpected similarity between specifications one and two can be explained by a mixture of two opposing effects: endogeneity of the actual wage rate and the spurious correlation between hours and wages resulting from defining wages as average hourly earnings. Specifications four through six in Table VI 13 Note that the loss in precision by excluding the wife's labor force experience from the instrument list is trivial. The only effect of including these variables is to increase the size of the wage coefficient.
14 The R2 for the regression of 1975 average hourly earnings on the 1976 reported wage is 0.42, and the coefficient on the reported wage is 0.91. 15 Controlling for the bivariate sample selection rule, the woman must work at some time during 1975 and be at work at the time of the 1976 interview, yields similar results to those reported below. Note that this wage measure is not observed for 427 women. It is, therefore, infeasible to use this variable in the sample selection function and the construction of the conditional means. This may explain why we reject the exogeneity of this wage measure even after controlling for sample selection biases.
Specification four reports the ordinary least squares estimates over the restricted subsample. The point estimates are quite close to those in the unrestricted sample. Specification five uses the 1976 wage measure as an instrument for the average hourly earnings. The point estimate increases by 380, and this increase is significant at the five per cent level. We interpret this as evidence of a substantial amount of measurement error in the average hourly earnings.16
The large estimated wage effect from specification five is at odds with the estimates in specification two. Specification six relates the exogeneity assumption on the 1976 wage measure for the restricted subsample, and we find a significant difference between the specifications with and without this measure. As in the case of the wife's labor market experience, the 1976 wage rate is correlated with unobservables in the labor supply equation, and the variations in this measure do not capture an exogenous change in the 1975 wage rate. The comparisons between specifications four through six strongly support the hypothesis that two sources of endogeneity are working through the average hourly earnings variable. In this sample these effects tend to cancel. The standard errors of the ordinary least squares estimates, however, suggest a greater degree of precision of the estimates than may be warranted. In other samples or with nonlinear specifications one should not expect these two effects to cancel.
Endogeneity of Children and Nonwife Income
Several previous studies have discussed the endogeneity of variables measuring previous life-cycle decisions in a static model of labor supply. Greenberg and Kosters (1973) and Smith (1980) , for example, discuss the endogeneity of unearned income resulting from persistent unobserved taste components. Schultz (1980) questions the interpretation of labor supply estimates containing family composition variables which are themselves the result of previous household decisions, and Hotz (1980) explicitly incorporates family formation into a lifecycle model of female labor supply. As a first step towards assessing the importance of the potential biases introduced by these variables, we use the tests for exogeneity described above. 17 When the nonwife income is treated as endogenous (specifications one and three in Table VII) , we again reject the exogeneity assumption on the wife's labor force experience variables. We reject both the equality of the wage and nonwife income coefficients. 1.5. Estimating and Testing Model Specifications with Controls for Self-Selection Biases All of the estimates in the previous sections were constructed from a subsample of working women without any controls for self-selection into the labor force. This subsample contains only fifty-eight per cent of the women in our sample and, as is well known, estimates derived from self-selected samples may be biased due to correlations between the independent variables and the stochastic disturbance induced by the sample selection rule. Indeed, most of the studies of female labor supply over the past ten years have focused on statistical controls for these sample selection biases.
In this study we examine several methods to correct for sample selection biases. All of these methods can be described in a common statistical framework. Define di as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ith woman works and zero otherwise. 19 These multi-stage procedures relax the assumption that the v* are normally distributed, as would be necessary in the maximum likelihood framework.
20The actual procedure used here was first to obtain the estimates of the conditional expected value. The structural labor supply function given in equation (1) In several of the models analyzed using this distribution, the estimated value of p was arbitrarily close to 1. The limiting distribution in this case is a singly truncated normal distribution. Imposing this limiting distribution yielded exact predictions of several women's labor force participation, and we deemed it an inappropriate statistical model. The shape of the estimated singly truncated normal distribution suggested that a skewed distribution might be appropriate. Thus, we used a log-normal distribution with conditional mean given by Testing exogeneity assumptions in these models that control for sample selection biases is analogous to the testing in the simple instrumental variables models. We form two different sets of independent variables, Z1 and Z2. As before, Z1 is a proper subset of Z2. We estimate the above models first using the set Z1 and then with the set of variables Z2, and we test for the equality of the coefficients of the labor supply equation in these two specifications. A rejection of the equality of these coefficients is considered a rejection of the exogeneity of the variables in the set Z2 not included in the set Z,. The construction of the variancecovariance matrix of these correlated estimates is quite complex, and requires accounting for the cross-specification covariance of the binary choice estimated parameters as well as the correlation of the structural parameter estimates with the binary choice estimates. The formulae for these asymptotic covariance matrices appear in Appendix 2. These formulae correct for the heteroscedasticity induced by the conditional mean adjustments as well as the estimation error from the multiple stage estimation method.
The exogeneity tests presented in the following two sections rely heavily upon the distributional assumption in the labor force participation function. The most restrictive assumption is that the reduced form disturbances in this function, under both the null and alternative hypotheses, fall in the same class. Specifically, suppose that the reduced form of the supposed endogenous instruments is given by Wi = 8'Zli + qi. The assumption maintained under these tests is that the disturbances u,i and u1,i where f, are the coefficients on the potential endogenous variables in the participation function, fall in the same class of distributions. Under the normality assumption, one set of sufficient conditions for the constancy of the distribution function is that both u,i and 7qi are homoscedastic normal random variables. Under the lognormal and logistic assumptions, there are no simple characterizations to guarantee this assumption.
Comparison of Sample Selection Models
In Table IX 22 See Appendix 2 for the construction of the across specification variance-covariance matrices when one estimator is maximum likelihood and the other is a multistage estimator. 23 Cogan's test, however, treated the wife's labor force experience as exogenous. these controls. For none of these three distributions is there any evidence that the failure to control for self-selection yields biased results. Table X repeats the  specifications in Table IX when the wife's labor force experience variables are considered exogenous. The Tobit specification is again rejected. We do, however, find considerable evidence of self-selection biases from the generalized Tobit models with experience included in the set of independent variables.
Exogeneity Tests with Self-Selection Controls
Very few of the earlier tests of exogeneity change when we control for selfselection into the labor force. In general, the magnitudes of the differences across various specifications do not change. The standard errors of the estimates do tend to increase, resulting in the failure to reject several of the null hypotheses. Due to the rejection of the Tobit models and the similarity of the estimates for the three different distributional assumptions in the generalized Tobit models, we carry out these tests with the more conventional generalized Tobit model under the normality assumption. The principal findings are discussed below. The only major change occurs in the test for the exogeneity of the wife's labor force experience. From Table XI we see that only in the Tobit and conditional Tobit models do we reject the exogeneity of these variables. For the three generalized Tobit models we do not reject the exogeneity assumption on the wife's labor force experience.24 The income effects and the impact of young children both become appreciably more positive. These changes, however, are not significant. This finding conflicts with Heckman's (1980) rejection of the exogeneity of previous labor market experience in the labor supply equation.25 In order to examine this discrepancy, we attempted to replicate Heckman's estimation and testing procedures on our data set. After controlling for self-selection into the labor force we were still unable to reject the hypothesis of exogenous wife's experience. In several specifications we found that controlling for the possible endogeneity of the wife's labor force experience did increase the estimated wage effect. However, this is not a robust result, and in none of the specifications examined were the estimates precise enough to reject the hypothesis of zero wage effects.
The large impact of the exogeneity assumption on experience in the Tobit models appears to arise from the fact that previous labor market experience is an excellent predictor of whether or not the woman is in the labor force during 1975. In these Tobit models, the impact of experience on participation can only take place through the wage effect in the labor supply equation. As a test of this restriction, we included the experience variables as separate regressors in the "structual" labor supply equation as well as using them in the reduced form wage equation. In this reformulation of the statistical model, the estimated wage coefficient fell from 4097 (1094) to 67 (300) and the income coefficient rose from -37.6 (17.9) to -9.2 (4.9) (standard errors in parentheses). These dramatic changes strongly support the conclusion that labor market experience "explains" participation and hours of work over and above its impact on a woman's wage rate.26 24 It appears that the conditional mean constructed using the wife's experience measure is controlling for the invalid "overidentifying restriction" noted in Section 1.1. See footnote 15 for a further discussion of the interaction of "endogenous" variables, the sample selection controls, and the disturbance in the labor supply equation. 25 Heckman's (1980) test for endogeneity of experience controls for sample selection induced biases, and he rejects the hypothesis of exogenous labor force experience in a model without the Tobit restrictions. 26 Another possible source of the discrepancy between the Tobit models and the generalized Tobit models arises from the fact that the Tobit models estimate jointly the wage and hours of work coefficients. In order to examine this possibility we modified the generalized Tobit estimation procedure to estimate simultaneously the hours and wage coefficient. First we estimated the reduced form labor force participation function and constructed the conditional expected values. Second, we used a nonlinear least squares procedure to estimate jointly the parameters in equations (5) and (6). We found (i) that the estimated wage and income effects are not sensitive to whether we used the instrumental variables procedures or the joint estimation procedures and (ii) that the models with exogenous experience (and conditional mean adjustments based upon exogenous experience) are not sensitive to either the choice of estimation procedure or to the inclusion of the experience variables in the "structural" labor supply equation. These results suggest that the interaction of exogenous experience and the Tobit models reflects the power of previous labor market experience to predict current labor force status. Table XII contains the estimates of the labor supply parameters under various exogeneity assumption on the nonwife income, the children variables, and the wife's labor force experience.27 As before, we do not reject the exogeneity of either the nonwife income or the children variables. There does appear to be some interaction between the wife's labor force experience variables and the number of young children in the household: when experience is treated as exogenous, relaxing the exogeneity assumption on children makes the estimated impact of young children more negative. The sample used here, however, is not large enough to uncover any statistically significant differences in the estimates.
CONTROLLING FOR VARYING MARGINAL TAX RATES
In this section we examine how the estimated labor supply parameters change when we take into account the fact that the relevant economic wage measure is the after-tax marginal wage rate. To explore this issue, we use Hall's (1973) linearization of the budget set. The marginal wage rate replaces the wage measure, and the virtual income, defined as the intercept of the linearized budget set at zero hours of work, replaces the nonwife income.28 With varying marginal tax rates, the marginal wage rates and virtual income explicitly depend upon the chosen hours of work. Hence, unlike Hall, we do not treat the marginal tax rate and virtual income as exogenous.
The estimation procedures used here are similar to those used in the first two sections. In the models without controls for self-selection into the labor force, these procedures allow one to estimate the relevant economic parameters. When modeling the joint labor force participation decision and the hours of work decision, however, it is difficult to justify the simple conditional mean adjustments. In this case the relevant economic decision depends upon the parameters of the tax system, and the statistical model must be able to evaluate the woman's preferences for work at all points along the budget set rather than just about zero hours of work. Such models are difficult to estimate and require exceptionally strong assumptions on the tax structure and the stochastic disturbances in the model. Hausman (1981) provides one model of this type to control for the effect of taxes on labor supply. Given these potential problems, the conditional mean adjustments presented here should be considered a first order approximation.
In Table XIII we present estimates of the single worker model with and without adjustment for taxes. Controlling for taxes appears to affect only the estimated wage coefficient. When taxes are taken into account, the estimated log-wage coefficient falls in each instance. The magnitude of this change is at most 33 hours, which translates to a change in the uncompensated wage effect of less than 10 hours per dollar increase in the before tax wage rate. All of the estimated wage coefficients with controls for taxes lie within one-fifth of one standard deviation of the estimates without taxes. In the light of the other possible sources of bias examined in the previous sections, the influence of taxes on the estimates of the labor supply parameters appears to be at most a second order effect. Table XIV contains the estimates of equation (7). From these estimates we cannot reject either the hypothesis that the women optimally take taxes into account or the hypothesis that the women fail to take taxes into consideration. The failure to reject in these instances is due to our inability to estimate precisely the coefficients on In (1 -ri) and the income terms due to the high correlation of our prediction of In (1 -ri) and the nonwife income variables. There is, in addition, a third hypothesis that is consistent with the estimates presented in Table XIV . Pechman and Okner (1974) have argued that although the federal income tax code implies a nonproportional tax rate, the actual incidence of taxation appears to reflect a proportional tax system.29 Under this hypothesis, a,= -a* and a2=0. The intercept ao would include a ln (1 -), where i is the constant marginal tax rate and the coefficient a* would be the product of the income effect and (1 -i). Consequently, our failure to reject the hypothesis that individuals fail to take taxes into account in their labor supply decisions is empirically indistinguishable from the hypothesis that all individuals face the same proportional tax rate.30 The power of this hypothesis test, however, is quite low.
The failure to reject the null hypothesis that individuals face a constant marginal tax rate has one important implication in this analysis. As discussed earlier, our controls for self-selection into the labor force are only an approximation to the correct controls in the presence of varying marginal tax rates. Under this null hypothesis, however, our controls are exactly those required to undertake an analysis such as in Hausman (1981) . The failure to reject this null hypothesis, then, implies that the procedures we use are not inconsistent with the observed labor supply data. 29 Specifically, their simulation methods show that for a wide range of income that the average ratio of tax burden to income is approximately a constant. There is, however, a fairly substantial variation within income categories around the mean. 30 One objection to this conclusion is that Pechman and Okner (1974) do find substantial variations around the mean tax rate. This objection would also apply to studies that use tax tables and standard deductions to define the marginal tax rate, which is how we derived the marginal tax rate used in Tables XIII and XIV. The result conflicts with Rosen's (1976) finding that taxes have a significant impact on married women's labor supply.31 A main difference between our analysis and Rosen's lies in the specification of the functional form of the labor supply function; we use a semilogarithmic form while Rosen uses a linear form. The semilogarithmic form implies that the uncompensated wage effect diminishes as wages increase, while the linear specification obviously implies a constant uncompensated effect. The only way a linear specification such as the one used by Rosen could capture a diminishing uncompensated effect would be for the interaction of the marginal tax rate (which depends upon the woman's wage) and the wage to have a nonzero coefficient. The difference between our results and Rosen's could be due to a difference in the functional form of the labor supply equation. A more detailed examination of this issue is certainly an important topic for future research.
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS
In the previous sections we have shown how the imposition of various economic and statistical assumptions can influence the estimates of the married women's labor supply function. These findings serve two purposes. First, they should be a valuable resource for the formulation of models of married women's labor supply in the future. Second, they allow one to reconcile the wide range of estimated labor supply effects in previous studies. Several of the results in this study, such as the rejection of the Tobit assumptions and the rejection of the exogeneity of the wife's labor force experience, have been previously documented and used to explain some of the across study variation in the estimates of behavioral labor supply responses. The framework used here, however, allows one to examine explicitly the consequences of each economic and statistial specification, and it provides the most comprehensive attempt to reconcile the wide range of estimated wage and income effects found in previous studies.
The most important set of findings in this paper pertains to the treatment of the average hourly earnings measure of the wage rate. Like DaVanzo, DeTray, and Greenberg (1973) and Borjas (1980), we find substantial measurement error in the average hourly earnings, and this measurement error is negatively correlated with the woman's annual hours of work. We examine one alternative measure of the woman's wage rate, namely, her wage rate on her current (time of interview) job, and it appears to be endogenous to the labor supply equation. The use of this wage rate as an instrumental variable to control for measurement error in the average hourly earnings induces a positive bias in the estimated wage effect. This suggests that the average hourly earnings measure combines measurement error and wage rate endogeneity, resulting in ordinary least squares point estimates that are not significantly different from the two stage least squares estimates THOMAS A. MROZ which control for these two sources of potential bias. In addition, we explore the use of the woman's previous labor market experience as an instrument for the average hourly earnings. Without controlling for self-selection into the labor force, we find it to be endogenous to the labor supply function, resulting in significant overestimates of the wage effect. When one treats the woman's labor market experience as endogenous, there is no evidence that the failure to control for self-selection into the labor force results in biased estimates of the labor supply parameters. As in Cogan's (1980b,  1981) analyses of fixed costs and labor supply, the imposition of the Tobit constraints to control for these possible self-selection biases leads to significant overestimates of the magnitudes of the wage effect, the income effect, and the impact of young children. In other words, the hours of work decisions made when the woman is in the labor force appear quite distinct from her labor force participation decision.
With conditional mean controls for self-selection into the labor force, we do not reject the exogeneity assumption on the woman's labor market experience. This result conflicts with Heckman's (1980) rejection of the exogeneity of previous labor market experience. When we impose this exogeneity assumption, however, we do find substantial evidence of self-selection biases. The inclusion of the woman's labor market experience in the set of instrumental variables does little to reduce the standard errors of the estimated wage and income coefficients, and it has a large, although not statistically significant, impaLct on the estimate of the effect of young children. This measure appears to be an instrument which does little to increase the accuracy of the estimates while complicating the required statistical model.
The children variables and the household's nonwife income do not appear to be endogenous to the woman's labor supply function. The corrections for varying marginal tax rates trivially reduce the estimates of the wage effect and have a small and inconsistent impact on the estimates of the income effects. These tax-corrected estimates lie within one-fifth of one standard error of the estimates that do not take taxes into account, and this suggests that taxation is of secondorder importance in explaining the across study variation of the estimates of the married women's labor supply function.32
On the basis of these results, we can exclude as invalid several of the sets of estimates found in Tables VI-XIII. What is surprising, however, is the narrow range of estimates of the income and substitution effects found in those specifications that we fail to reject.33 The maximum point estimate of the log wage coefficient in the 27 unique sets of estimates which pass the specification tests is 161. This translates to a 40 hour per year uncompensated effect when 32 In Mroz (1984) , the estimates from the household model imply the same behavioral responses as those from the single worker model presented here and yield the same results in the tests for exogeneity and self-selection biases. 33 The set of specifications we fail to reject is evaluated at the sample's mean wage. The maximum upper bound of the 27 ninety-five per cent confidence intervals is an uncompensated wage effect of 150 hours per year per dollar increase in the wage rate. For the income effects, the largest point estimate implies a 6 hour reduction in annual hours for a $1000 increase in the family's nonwife income. The maximum bound of the 27 ninety-five per cent confidence intervals for this income effect is a 22 hour per year reduction in the wife's labor supply. These estimates are small and precise. They also suggest that the range of estimates from previous studies presented in Table I is quite misleading.
The many sets of estimates and specification tests presented in this study are not independent. One should view the 27 sets of estimates referred to in the preceding paragraph more as a single experiment which exhibits only minor sensitivities to local variations of assumptions than as corroborating experiments. In order to augment this evidence, a possible cross-validation of these results can be obtained by asking how well the empirically important theoretical and methodological criteria uncovered in this study explain the range of estimates found in Table I . On the one hand, an extrapolation from one study to another or one data set to another is, of course, fraught with unobservable sources of error and should be viewed with some caution. On the other hand, the simple and consistent explanations we offer for why these studies disagree with our estimates suggest that such an extrapolation is a valuable tool for reconciling the wide range of estimates.
This study indicates that specifications using the wife's labor market experience as an instrumental variable without controls for self-selection into the labor force and specifications using the Tobit model to control for self-selection biases yield large and biased estimates of the wage and income effects. As predicted, the studies using Tobit models or the wife's labor market experience to instrument the wage rate without controls for self-selection into the labor force (Cogan (1980a) Table XI suggests that this is why his estimates of the wage effect are much smaller than the other Tobit estimates in Table I . Layard, Barton, and Zabalza do use the wife's labor market experience to predict wage rates. An examination of their reduced form wage equation, however, reveals that the experience variables have almost no impact on the wage rate. This most likely explains why their wage effects are much smaller than those from the other studies using the wife's labor force experience to predict the wage rate. in magnitude than those found in our analysis. Here we explore several possible reasons for Cogan's results.
First, Cogan uses many fewer overidentifying restrictions to estimate his model than are used in the results reported here. When we impose the assumption of an exactly identified model (leaving the structural equation unchanged and exactly identifying the wage effect through the log-experience measure used by Cogan), we are able to obtain larger estimates of the wage effect quite close to Cogan's point estimates. The multiple stage estimation procedures we use, however, yield large standard errors which include our range of point estimates in a ninety-five per cent confidence interval. When we relax the exactly identifying restriction by using the log-experience variable and its square as identifying variables for the wage effects, the point estimate of the log-wage coefficient falls from 1100 to -120. Thus Cogan's model appears to be quite sensitive to his exact specification. These results, in conjunction with Heckman's (1980) rejection of the exogeneity of experience, do bring to question the power of our test for the exogeneity of the wife's previous labor market experience with the controls for sample selection biases.
A second possible source of discrepancy stems from Cogan's model of the sample selection rule. Cogan imposes proportionality restrictions between the coefficients on the identifying variables in the wage equation and the coefficients on those variables in the labor force participation function. This approach partially constrains the impact of experience on labor force participation to operate through the wage effect. Although Cogan's assumptions are not as restrictive as those in the Tobit model, the extreme sensitivity of the Tobit estimates to the identifying restriction on the experience variables (discussed in Section 1.7) suggests a possible source of specification error. The generalized Tobit models used in this study do not impose these restrictions, and an investigation of these assumptions would be a useful extension of this study.
Only two studies in Table I treat the woman's wage rate as exogenous, Leuthold (1978) and Hausman (1981). Leuthold's wage measure is the woman's wage rate on her current or previous job; this is not an average hourly earnings measure. These variables are not available in the PSID, making any simple comparison difficult. In addition, her controls for taxes do not correspond to those used in this study,35 and she treats both the marginal tax rate and disposable income as exogenous. Her estimated wage effect does not fall outside the range of estimates we fail to reject, but given her treatment of taxes, it is not obvious that she measures the same labor supply effects as this study.36
Because of methodological differences, Hausman's (1981) estimates are the least comparable to those in this analysis. Although his hours of work function is linear in wages and income, the complex switching regression framework required to take account of the discontinuous and possibly nonconvex after-tax 35 Leuthold uses the marginal after-tax wage rate and the after-tax disposable income rather than a measure of the virtual income from the linearized budget set. 36 Another possible explanation for why she obtains such small wage coefficients is classical measurement error in her wage measure. budget constraint makes any comparisons based on the previous sections merely speculative. Additionally, he does not report the instrumental variables used to predict the wages for nonworkers, making it impossible to evaluate his exogeneity assumptions. We do note, however, that the assumptions in his convex and nonconvex models closely correspond to Cogan's assumptions, and this may be one reason why he obtains such large estimates of the income and wage effects. A more detailed examination of Hausman's models is required before one can conclude that it is only his more exacting controls for taxes that generate the large behavioral responses found in his analyses.
The only estimates not yet discussed are those of Boskin (1973), Heckman (1976)-generalized Tobit, Heckman (1980), Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), and Schultz (1980)-instrumental variables. Of these five sets of estimates, only the two by Heckman do not correspond to the estimates reported here, even though he controlled for self-selection bias in both sets of estimates and also controlled for endogenous experience in his 1980 estimates. Heckman's (1976) generalized Tobit procedure yields a large negative uncompensated wage effect and a large positive income effect. When we used procedures similar to Heckman's with our data set, we were unable to find such point estimates. Our estimates, however, had large standard errors, and we could not reject the hypothesis that our point estimates were equal to the point estimates reported by Heckman. Unfortunately these estimates by Heckman were only initial consistent estimates for a Tobit procedure, and he did not report enough information to calculate the standard errors of these estimates. Our results suggest that Heckman's results may be estimated imprecisely, but a more detailed examination with his data set will be needed in order to make any more definitive inferences.
Heckman's (1980) estimates imply a large positive wage response that is significantly different from those found in the specifications that we fail to reject on methodological grounds. He treats experience as endogenous and uses a generalized Tobit procedure to control for self-selection into the labor force. According to the methodological results reported here, we would not expect such procedures to yield large wage effects. When we used his procedures with our data set, we were unable to replicate his point estimates.37 We did find certain choices of instrumental variables that yielded larger point estimates than those reported in the previous tables, but none of these were precisely estimated.
The procedure Heckman uses to obtain his estimates that control for both self-selection bias and endogeneity of wages, however, does not yield consistent estimates when one rejects the joint hypothesis of exogenous experience and no self-selection bias.38 In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to examine his procedures in detail. First, he treats experience as exogenous and uses a probit 37 Unlike our results, Heckman fails to reject exogenous experience without controls for selfselection bias, and he also fails to reject the hypothesis that self-selection is not important when he treats experience as exogenous. Only when he tests the joint hypothesis does he reject the individual hypotheses. This suggests that there may be some fundamental difference between the two data sets. Table I in agreement with our preferred specifications.40 The important methodological considerations uncovered by our statistical specification tests appear to single out studies with similar estimates and exclude only estimates differing from our preferred set. These inferences strongly support our methodological criteria, and suggest that the small income and wage effects found in this study provide a much more accurate picture of the behavioral responses of working women to variations in nonlabor income and wages than those found in most previous studies.4" The negative income tax experiments provide additional data sources for cross-validating the income and substitution effects found in this study. It has been argued that these experiments do permit one to examine more "'exogenous" variations in wages and incomes than can be found in nonexperimental data. Indeed, the range of estimates reported by Moffitt and Kehrer (1981) for the estimates of the wage and income effects for married women from the experimental literature suggests smaller responses than one would infer from a casual examination of the estimates in Table I . Given the conceptual difficulties of 39 Only Nakamura and Nakamura control for self-selection into the labor force. 40 See the above note on Layard, Barton, and Zabalza's reduced form wage equation for a possible explanation for why their instrumental variables estimates with the wife's labor market experience variables and without controls for self-selection yield small estimates of the wage effect. Leuthold's estimates are also similar to our preferred estimates, but she does not control for possible measurement error in the wage rate. 41 Our results do not imply that the labor force participation decision is insensitive to variations in wage rates and nonlabor income. In fact, the large estimates of the income and wage effects from the Tobit models suggests that the labor force participation decision may be quite responsive to changes in these economic factors.
analyzing the nonrandom treatment and control assignments in the experimental data and the small number of studies directly estimating behavioral responses, we are hesitant to use the experimental results as a strong cross-validation of our estimates. However, we do believe that a thorough examination of the experimental data could provide a strong test of the robustness of the results found in this study.
CONCLUSION
In this study we find that economic and statistical assumptions can have a substantial impact on the estimates of the behavioral labor supply parameters. The three most important assumptions are (i) the Tobit assumption to control for self-selection into the labor force, (ii) the exogeneity assumption on the wife's wage rate, and (iii) the use of the wife's labor market experience as an instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity of the wife's wage. The Tobit models exaggerate both the income and wage effects. The two exogeneity assumptions induce an upward bias in the estimated wage effect; the bias due to the exogeneity of the wife's labor market experience, however, greatly diminishes when one controls for self-selection into the labor force through the use of generalized Tobit procedures. After controlling for these specification problems, the estimates of the income and substitution effects are invariant to a wide range of assumptions. Among the potential specifications found to be unimportant are (i) exogeneity assumptions on the nonwife income and the number of children in the household, (ii) controls for nonproportional income taxes, and (iii) controls for self-selection into the labor force when experience is treated as endogenous.
The range of labor supply estimates that we fail to reject suggests that the labor supply behavior of working married women matches the estimated behavior of prime aged males. Such a conclusion conflicts with most commonly held beliefs about female labor supply. Killingsworth (1983, p. 432 ) recently summarized the current evidence for such beliefs, ". . . most of the available evidence suggests that female labor supply, measured as either labor force participation or hours of work, is considerably more wage and property income elastic than male labor supply." In this study, we are able to obtain large estimates of the income and wage coefficients. Our statistical tests, however, emphatically reject the economic and statistical assumptions needed to obtain these large wage and income effects.
The principal finding of this analysis is that economic factors such as wage rates, taxes, and nonlabor incomes have a small impact on the labor supply behavior of working married women. The array of estimates we have reported and our examination of the methodologies and estimates from previous studies clearly support this conclusion. Of course, this study and those reviewed here are all based upon a simple economic model of the behavior of married women. In order to interpret the estimated coefficients as behavioral labor supply responses, a woman must face a continuum of job offers at a constant wage rate and costlessly select the offer yielding the highest utility. The types of models considered here ignore many factors such as search costs, imperfectly elastic In this appendix we report the formulae used to construct the covariance matrices for sets of correlated estimators. Formal derivations of these estimators of the covariance matrices can be found in MaCurdy and Mroz (1984) . First, we present the formulae for two instrumental variable estimators. Second, we report the formulae for the estimators when the instrumental variable estimators depend upon pre-estimated quantities, such as conditional expected values derived from first stage estimates of the labor force participation function. Third, we report the formulae when one of the estimators is a multi-stage estimator (as in case 2) and the other estimator is a maximum likelihood or quasi-maximum likelihood estimator. 
